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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici curiae, legal experts in international and 
constitutional law, believe that a majority of the en 
banc panel in Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc), mistakenly affirmed Ali 
Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul’s conviction by a 
military commission for a non-international war 
crime.  The main concurring opinion in that case 
misconceived how international law defines the 
jurisdiction of law-of-war military commissions.  As 
amici argue below, it is the Constitution—not 
international law—that limits the jurisdiction of law-
of-war military commissions.2  
 
Amici have a professional interest in clarifying 
the relationship between international and 
constitutional law as it bears on the jurisdiction of 
military commissions, especially absent apparent 
geographic or temporal limits on the conflict known 
as the global war on terror.   
 
The appendix includes a full list of amici. 
                                               
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and written 
copies have been filed with the Clerk of the Court.  Supreme 
Court Rule 37.3(a).  Counsel of record for all parties received 
notice of amici’s intent to file a brief at least 10 days prior to the 
due date.  Id., Rule 37.2(a).  Counsel for amici affirm that counsel 
for a party did not write any part of this brief.  Nor has any 
person or entity contributed financially to the preparation or 
submission of this brief.  Id., Rule 37.6.    
2 Unless otherwise indicated, “commission” and “tribunal” refer 
to law-of-war military commissions, not commissions created 
during periods of occupation or to try violations of martial law. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests the 
judicial power in the federal courts and mandates 
that all crimes be tried by jury.  This Court has 
construed the Constitution to permit the 
establishment of military commissions to try war 
crimes in circumstances of military necessity, based 
on pragmatic considerations and the combined war 
powers of the President and Congress.  To minimize 
intrusion on Article III, however, the Court has 
prudently limited military commission jurisdiction to 
the prosecution of crimes that violate the law of war, 
which, by definition, is part of the law of nations.    
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit wrongly affirmed Ali Hamza 
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul’s conviction by military 
commission for inchoate conspiracy.  That crime does 
not violate the law of war, precluding the 
commission’s jurisdiction.  To justify jurisdiction in 
excess of the limits that this Court has placed on 
military commissions, the D.C. Circuit’s main 
concurring opinion rejected even the government’s 
proposed limits (themselves broader than the limits 
set by this Court) and declined to impose any 
jurisdictional restrictions.  That view is based on a 
misconception of international law and of how 
international and constitutional law interact.  The 
main concurrence also conflated the power of the 
political branches to establish military commissions, 
despite Article III, with the power to specify offenses 
triable by military commission. 
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The law of war, a branch of international law, 
establishes the outer boundaries of military 
commission jurisdiction.  Allowing the commission’s 
jurisdiction to encompass offenses other than war 
crimes transfers authority to adjudicate certain 
federal crimes from the federal courts to the executive 
branch.  Hence, “Trial by military commission raises 
separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order.”  
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 
Because the armed conflict known as the global 
war on terror lacks apparent geographic and temporal 
limits, a decision to vest military commissions with 
jurisdiction over wholly domestic crimes effectively 
empowers the political branches to use military 
commissions as alternatives to federal courts 
anywhere in the global theater of war for an indefinite 
period.  This is not hyperbole.  The D.C. Circuit’s main 
concurring opinion not only rejected the government’s 
position that military commission jurisdiction is 
limited to war crimes and crimes that historically 
have been tried before such commissions; it further 
speculated that military commissions might be 
helpful to try, for example, innovative cybercrimes.  
With the nation on a long-term war footing, military 
commissions threaten to become a permanent feature 
of the federal judicial landscape, untethered by the 
jurisdictional limits that this Court has imposed.  
 
A military commission convicted Bahlul more than 
seven years ago.  His case has been pending in the 
D.C. Circuit for more than five years.  Despite its 
numerous decisions in Bahlul, the D.C. Circuit has 
been unable to agree on any jurisdictional limits on 
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military commissions.  This issue “is extraordinarily 
important and deserves a definitive answer,” Bahlul, 
840 F.3d at 760 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), which 
only this Court can provide. 
 
This Court has never countenanced such a broad 
and vague exception to Article III.  It should grant 
certiorari to safeguard the integrity and 
independence of the federal courts—and to clarify 
that the same necessity that authorizes military 
commissions also limits their jurisdiction.  
    
ARGUMENT 
I. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S MAIN 
CONCURRENCE MISTAKENLY 
TREATED INTERNATIONAL LAW—
RATHER THAN THE CONSTITUTION— 
AS THE JUDICIAL CONSTRAINT ON 
MILITARY COMMISSION 
JURISDICTION 
 
A military commission convicted Ali Hamza 
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul of conspiracy to commit 
war crimes.  Bahlul, 840 F.3d 757, 758 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (per curiam); Bahlul v. United States, 
767 F.3d 1, 7–8, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).  The 
government has conceded that Bahlul’s crime is not a 
war crime under international law.  Brief for the 
United States at 34, Bahlul, 840 F.3d 757 (No. 11-
1324).  The D.C. Circuit nonetheless upheld Bahlul’s 
conviction based in part on the main concurrence’s 
expansive and unprecedented view of military 
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commission jurisdiction.  Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 758 (per 
curiam); id. at 760 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurring opinion is 
predicated on the erroneous assumption that if 
Bahlul’s challenge were to succeed, foreign nations, 
acting through “the guise” of international law, would 
be entitled to “dictate” constraints on a U.S. military 
commission’s jurisdiction and that international law 
would be incorporated “into the U.S. Constitution as 
a judicially enforceable constraint on Congress and 
the President.”  Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759, 772 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  This is a straw man.  
Contrary to that opinion’s characterization, this 
Court consistently has recognized only a narrow, 
atextual exception to Article III for military 
commissions and has used the law of war to set the 
boundary of that exception.  
 
A. This Court Recognized a Narrow, Atextual 
Exception to Article III by Placing a Limited 
Judicial Power in Law-of-War Military 
Commissions. 
 
Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the 
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish,” and that “[t]he 
Trial of all Crimes, except in cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury.”   
 
While Article III’s text admits no exceptions to 
these mandates, this Court has recognized a handful 
of narrow exceptions that authorize the political 
branches to exercise adjudicatory power in limited 
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circumstances. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military 
Courts and Article III, 103 Geo. L.J. 933, 934 (2015). 
Such departures from Article III’s usual exclusivity 
are rare and, because they facially violate Article III’s 
text, demand constitutional justification.   
 
For military tribunals, that justification is necessity, 
which defines—and for the same reason limits—the 
nature and scope of their jurisdiction.  See Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(stressing that “each aspect of [a military commission’s] 
seemingly broad jurisdiction” is “supported by a 
separate military exigency”); see also Ex Parte Milligan, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 21–22 (1866); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. 1, 35–37 (1942).   
 
A law-of-war military commission’s jurisdiction 
therefore is “limited to offenses cognizable during 
time of war” and “its role is primarily a factfinding 
one—to determine, typically on the battlefield itself, 
whether the defendant has violated the law of war.”  
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 596–97 (plurality opinion).  
Colonel William Winthrop—the “Blackstone of 
Military Law”—wrote that these military 
commissions have jurisdiction only over war crimes 
committed during war and in the “theatre of war.”  
See id., 548 U.S. at 597–98 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957)); William Winthrop, 
Military Law and Precedents 836–41 (rev. 2d ed. 
1920) (hereinafter “Winthrop”). 
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B. Law-of-War Military Commissions May Only 
Prosecute War Crimes Recognized by the Law 
of Nations. 
 
This Court first sustained a law-of-war military 
commission in Ex Parte Quirin, in which saboteurs 
violated the law of war during World War II by going 
behind enemy lines to destroy property used or useful 
in prosecuting war.  This conduct, according to the 
Court, violated the law of war and was subject to 
punishment by military commission, a precept that 
had “so generally been accepted as valid by 
authorities on international law.”  317 U.S. at 35–36.3  
This Court explained the law of war as part of 
international law: “From the very beginning of its 
history this Court has recognized and applied the law 
of war as including that part of the law of nations 
which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, 
rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy 
individuals.”  Id. at 27–28.  Quirin thus correctly 
                                               
3 The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence erred by citing Quirin as 
an example of a military commission trying a crime other than a 
war crime.  Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 763 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).   
The Court in Quirin, as discussed, stated that the conduct 
relevant to its holding violated the law of war.  Quirin, 317 U.S. 
at 35–36.  Further, at that time, the status of espionage as an 
offense against the law of nations was, at best, ambiguous. See, 
e.g., 2 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise § 252 
(Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (listing “espionage” as 
one of four kinds of “war crimes”); see also id. § 255 (“Espionage 
. . . bear[s] a twofold character.  International Law gives a right 
to belligerents to use [it].  On the other hand, it gives a right to 
belligerents to consider [it], when committed by enemy soldiers 
or enemy private individuals . . . as [an] act[] of illegitimate 
warfare, and consequently liable to punishment—though it 
seems improper to charactise [sic] such act[s] as war crimes.”).  
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defined “law of war” as a “branch of international 
law.”  Id. at 29.  In the course of describing that law, 
the Court cited the Fourth Hague Convention and 
numerous treatises on international law.  See id. at 
30 n.7, 31 n.8. 
 
In Quirin, Article of War 15 authorized military 
commission jurisdiction as a narrow exception to 
Article III but properly restricted that jurisdiction to 
violations of the law of war.  Id. at 29.  Even with 
these jurisdictional restrictions, “Quirin represents 
the high-water mark of military power to try enemy 
combatants for war crimes.”  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597 
(plurality opinion).     
 
In re Yamashita again considered the jurisdiction 
of military commissions to be confined to offenses 
against the law of war. 327 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1946).  
Citing the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention, 
the Court held that “acts directed against the civilian 
population of an occupied country and against 
prisoners of war are recognized in international law 
as violations of the law of war.”  Id. at 14.  Similarly, 
in Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court found “a basis in 
conventional and long-established law” for violations 
of the law of war.  339 U.S. 763, 787 (1950).  That 
“conventional and long-established law” was 
international law.  Id. at 787–88.  Eisentrager thus 
exclusively cited international legal sources, 
including the Hague Conventions and Oppenheim’s, 
Vattel’s, and Lawrence’s international law treatises, 
to reach this conclusion.  Id.    
 
In Hamdan, the government charged Salim 
Ahmed Hamdan with conspiracy to commit offenses 
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triable by military commission.  548 U.S. at 569–70 
(majority opinion).  A plurality held that Hamdan’s 
conspiracy charge is not an offense that by the law of 
war may be tried by military commission.  Id. at 610–
12 (plurality opinion).  This is in contrast to the main 
concurrence’s finding in Bahlul that conspiracy is 
“well within” the limits of a military commission’s 
jurisdiction, “[w]herever one might ultimately draw” 
those limits.  Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 771 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring).  By reviewing international law sources, 
the plurality found that conspiracy “does not appear 
in either the Geneva Conventions or the Hague 
Conventions—the major treaties on the law of war.” 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion). 
 
C. This Court Has Recognized that the 
Constitution Limits the Jurisdiction of 
Military Commissions to Violations of the Law 
of War. 
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence in Bahlul 
failed to recognize that this Court has limited the 
subject matter jurisdiction of military commissions to 
violations of the law of war.  That opinion 
characterized Bahlul’s contention—that because 
inchoate conspiracy is not an offense under 
international law, the commission lacked jurisdiction 
to try him—as “extraordinary.”  Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 
759 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  Quite the contrary, 
this Court has described military commissions, not 
the role of international law in defining their 
jurisdiction, as “extraordinary”: “[T]rial by military 
commission is an extraordinary measure raising 
important questions about the balance of power in our 
10 
 
 
constitutional structure . . . .” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
567 (majority opinion).  
 
In a government of delegated powers, neither 
Congress nor the President, even acting together, 
may constitutionally depart from Article III’s vesting 
of the judicial power in the federal courts, except in 
the rare circumstances recognized by this Court.  
Even under these circumstances, the Constitution 
does not authorize the political branches to define the 
jurisdiction of military commissions without regard to 
the limits imposed by the Constitution. 
 
II. THE EXPANSION OF MILITARY 
COMMISSION JURISDICTION 
THREATENS TO FURTHER ATROPHY 
THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE 
OF ARTICLE III FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Removing Judicial Power from the Judicial 
Branch, and Placing that Power in the Political 
Branches, Threatens the Integrity of the 
Judicial Branch and the Right to Trial by Jury.  
 
An independent judiciary is fundamental to the 
American system of governance: the Declaration of 
Independence cited it as a basis for the American 
Revolution, and the judicial system’s structural and 
individual rights safeguards were enshrined in 
Article III of the Constitution.  See The Declaration of 
Independence para. 11 (U.S. 1776); Stern v. Marshall, 
564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011).  Article III “protects the 
independence of the Judicial Branch” and “is ‘an 
inseparable element of the constitutional system of 
checks and balances.’”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 482–83 
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(quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (plurality opinion)).   
 
Article III could not “serve its purpose in the 
system of checks and balances” if the legislative or 
executive branches “could confer the Government’s 
‘judicial power’ on entities outside of Article III.”  
Stern, 564 U.S. at 484.  Thus, absent rare exceptions, 
the judicial power “cannot be shared with the 
Legislature or Executive.”  B&B Hardware, Inc. v. 
Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., concurring).  “[S]o long as the judiciary remains 
truly distinct from both the legislature and the 
Executive,” “the general liberty of the people can 
never be endangered” from “the courts of justice.”  The 
Federalist No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. 
Rossiter ed., 1961).  Liberty has everything “to fear 
from” a merger with the political branches that would 
degrade the judiciary’s independence.  Id. at 465 
(“[F]rom the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is 
in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or 
influenced by its co-ordinate branches.”).    
 
Article III’s mandates remain in force during war.  
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 
(2008) (“The laws and the Constitution are designed 
to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary 
times.”); Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120.  The right 
to a criminal trial before a jury within an independent 
judicial system was at least as important to the 
Framers as the right to habeas corpus described in 
Boumediene: It was included in the Declaration of 
Independence, Article III, and the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, and it is emphasized throughout the 
Federalist Papers.  See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 
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16 (1955) (“This right of trial by jury ranks very high 
in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards.”); 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 119–20.  It applies 
“equally in war and in peace, and covers with the 
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, 
and under all circumstances.”  See Milligan, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) at 120–21.  Thus, to protect the judicial 
branch’s independence, integrity, and robust role in 
the Constitution’s delicate structure of checks and 
balances, military commissions must have defined, 
narrow limits.  
 
B. The Jurisdiction of Law-of-War Military 
Commissions Is Limited by the Necessity that 
Justifies the Commissions’ Existence.  
“The military commission, a tribunal neither 
mentioned in the Constitution nor created by statute, 
was born of military necessity.” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
590 (plurality opinion); see also Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) at 76–80.  It is not a federal court “ordain[ed] and 
establish[ed]” by Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.  
  
Military commissions have, historically and 
functionally, proved necessary in three contexts—
martial law, occupation, and war. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. 
at 595–96 (plurality opinion).  During the former two, 
necessity compels the establishment of a temporary 
substitute that can administer justice expeditiously and 
fairly until the national judiciary resumes operating 
normally. Cf. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of 
Belligerent Occupation 133–35 (2009). 
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The rationale for law-of-war commissions differs, 
see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion), as does 
their jurisdiction. Unlike the other two types of 
commissions, law-of-war commissions do not adjudicate 
all crimes and civil cases during times of martial law or 
military occupation.  See id.  In those circumstances, the 
regular courts may not be “open and their process 
unobstructed.” Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.  
Because it may be impracticable to try war crimes on the 
battlefield, see generally Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779, 
the Court has recognized that it may be necessary 
during wartime “to seize and subject to disciplinary 
measures those enemies who in their attempt to 
thwart or impede our military effort have violated the 
law of war.” Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28–29. Military 
commissions prosecute battlefield violations of the law 
of war during wartime.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 518 (2004); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27–29.  Practical 
considerations, like distance and lack of institutions or 
staff, may preclude trying war crimes in courts martial 
or regular federal courts. 
 
For such functional reasons, the Court has 
approved military commissions based on the historical 
methodology of constitutional interpretation expressed 
in the context of executive power by Justice Frankfurter: 
“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting 
government cannot supplant the Constitution or 
legislation, but they give meaning to the words” and 
take into account “the gloss which life has written upon 
them.”  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The 
Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).  This constitutional 
methodology can also apply in contexts, like the present 
one, other than executive power.  See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. 
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Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014) 
(collecting cases). 
  
At times, history thus properly informs the meaning 
of the Constitution. But the historical precedents that 
authorize military commissions also limit them.  And 
historically, it is this Court’s interpretation of the 
constitutional role of international law in defining the 
commission’s jurisdiction that has imposed “judicially 
enforceable constraint[s]” on the jurisdiction of military 
commissions.  Bahlul may not be convicted by military 
commission for a crime that, as the government 
concedes, Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring), international law does not recognize as 
triable by military commission.   
 
 “The tendency of a principle to expand itself to the 
limit of its logic” must “be counteracted by the 
tendency to confine itself within the limits of its 
history.”  Benjamin J. Cardozo, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process 51 (1921).  Necessity supplies a 
rationale for establishing a temporary non-Article III 
tribunal for prosecuting war crimes.  It does not 
supply a rationale for vesting that tribunal with 
jurisdiction over crimes that do not violate the law of 
war.  Perhaps, as the D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence 
suggested, tribunals with broader jurisdiction would 
be expedient in the global war on terror.  See Bahlul, 
840 F.3d at 770–71 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(discussing cyberattacks as a potential crime triable 
by military commission).  But expedience does not, of 
course, render such tribunals constitutional.  
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C. Necessity Limits Military Commissions’ 
Jurisdiction to Offenses Against the 
(International) Law of War. 
 
Because necessity alone authorizes the military 
commission, it perforce limits the commission’s 
jurisdiction by reference to the particular, concrete 
necessity at issue—“the exigencies of war.”  Hamdan, 
548 U.S. at 590 (plurality opinion); see also Milligan, 
71 U.S. at 90.  Battlefield necessity also reinforces 
what Quirin, Yamashita, Eisentrager, and Hamdan 
all express or imply: the law of war is part of 
international law and thus limits the jurisdiction of 
law-of-war military commissions.   
 
In non-military-commission cases, this Court has 
also affirmed that the law of war is international law.  
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27–28, 28 n.5 (citing numerous 
cases from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).  
In the Prize Cases, for instance, the Court held that 
the “laws of war, as established among nations, have 
their foundation in reason, and all tend to mitigate 
the cruelties and misery produced by the scourge of 
war.”  Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1863).  
Likewise, in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, the 
Court considered the “general laws of war, as 
recognized by the law of nations applicable to this 
case.”  92 U.S. 286, 286 (1875).  
 
The Department of Defense Law of War Manual 
and the Army Field Manual addressing the law of 
land warfare similarly define the law of war as a part 
of international law.  U.S. Dep’t of Defense Law of 
War Manual, at 7 (June 2015); U.S. Army Field 
Manual FM 27-10, at 4 (July 1956).  The Lieber Code, 
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signed by President Lincoln in 1863 to regulate the 
conduct of Union forces, described the law of war as 
“a branch” of “the law of nations.”  See Francis Lieber, 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field art. 27 (War Dep’t 1863).     
 
Law-of-war scholars share this view.  Winthrop 
explained that “law of war” is “a distinct canon of the 
Law of Nations” and defined “law of war” as a “branch 
of International Law which prescribes the rights and 
obligations of belligerents,” as well as persons under 
military government or martial law or in the theater 
of war.  Winthrop 773.  More recent commentators 
have observed that “the jurisdiction of military 
commissions has been set by the bounds of 
international law directly incorporated within 
American law,” Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, 
Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 328, 334 (2002), and that the law of war is a branch 
of international law, Major Alex G. Peterson, Order 
Out of Chaos: Domestic Enforcement of the Law of 
Internal Armed Conflict, 171 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 
(2002). 
 
The government has argued that there is a federal 
“common law of war” that expands the subject matter 
jurisdiction of a U.S. law-of-war military commission 
to encompass war crimes other than those that violate 
international law; these crimes, it is said, were 
historically tried by military commissions in the 
United States. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 810 (dissenting 
opinion).  But as a government of delegated, 
enumerated powers, the Constitution prohibits 
federal common law crimes.  United States v. Hudson 
& Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33–34 (1812).  The 
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Declare War Clause and Congress’s other Article I, 
§ 8, war powers, in combination with the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, authorize Congress to establish 
military commissions to try war crimes.  Quirin, 317 
U.S. at 26–27.  They do not, and constitutionally 
cannot, authorize new domestic war crimes over 
which the commission may constitutionally exercise 
jurisdiction.  See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified 
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1019, 
1050–52 (2011). 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence located 
political branch authority to establish law-of-war 
tribunals in the aggregate of executive and 
congressional war powers.  See Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 
761–62 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591–92 (plurality opinion); 
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 10.  The concurrence also quoted 
Winthrop and Justice Story as authorities for the 
same proposition.  But it misread both to support a 
proposition the Court has never embraced: that 
constitutional authority to establish law-of-war 
tribunals, which derives from the political branches’ 
war powers, Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591, also empowers 
the political branches to define war crimes.  Neither 
Winthrop nor Story adopted this view.  See Winthrop 
831; 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States § 1192 (1833).  
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D. The D.C. Circuit’s Main Concurrence 
Erroneously Defined International Law as 
“the Dictates of Foreign Nations and the 
International Community.” 
1. International law develops through consent. 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence characterized 
Bahlul’s jurisdictional argument as an effort that would 
subject the United States “to the dictates of foreign 
nations and the international community, as 
embodied in international law,” and would “allow 
foreign nations, through the guise of international 
law, to set constitutional limits enforceable in U.S. 
courts against the U.S. war effort.”  Bahlul, 840 F.3d 
at 759, 772 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (emphasis in 
original). 
 
Neither foreign nations nor the international 
community “dictate” international law.  The basic norm 
of international law since the nineteenth century has 
been consent.  Blackstone, for example, described the 
law of nations as “a system of rules . . . established by 
universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the 
world.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England 66 (1769).  
 
Because the law of war is part of international law, 
the United States typically communicates its consent 
either expressly (in treaties it has ratified) or 
implicitly (in acknowledged principles of customary 
international law).  The United States actively 
participates in shaping the evolution of international 
custom, as it has since the founding.  See, e.g., Office 
of the Legal Adviser, United States Dep’t of State, 
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Digest of United States Practice in International Law 
2014, at 302–03 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2014).  
Today, because of the nation’s economic, military, and 
geopolitical power, its influence on the development 
of customary international law, especially the law of 
war, is correspondingly robust.  
 
Because of the consensual basis of international 
law, the United States, like all nations, may refuse to 
consent to an emerging customary rule that it 
disfavors: The persistent objector doctrine provides 
that any “state that has persistently objected to a rule 
of customary international law during the course of 
the rule’s emergence is not bound by the rule.”  Ted 
Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The 
Principle of the Persistent Objector in International 
Law, 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 457, 457 (1985). 
 
2. It is not unremarkable for international law to 
play a role in constitutional interpretation. 
 
It is thus hardly “extraordinary” or a “suicide pact,” 
Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759, 772 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring), for the United States to abide by the 
principles of international law to which it has consented. 
Nor is it extraordinary for those principles to influence 
constitutional interpretation.  The Constitution refers to 
international law in several provisions.  Constitutional 
powers subsume authority conferred and given 
substantive content by international law. For 
example, the Constitution’s vesting of Congress’s 
powers related to war, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; “the 
executive Power,” id. art. II, § 1; and the Commander-
in-Chief power, id. art. II, § 2, confer wartime powers 
on Congress and the President derived from and 
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informed by international law.4 The Constitution 
takes precedence over international law in the event 
of an unavoidable conflict, see, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Reid, 354 U.S. at 16–18, but 
international law, in appropriate circumstances, 
informs several of its provisions.  
 
The Constitution confers certain powers on the 
President and Congress in wartime precisely because 
international law regards them as well-established 
incidents of waging war. Hamdi, for example, 
recognized executive power to detain belligerents for 
the duration of a conflict “based on longstanding law-
of-war principles.”  542 U.S. at 521 (collecting 
international authorities); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 
28-29. 
 
And in Hamdan, the Court’s most recent decision 
on military commissions, the Court concluded that 
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949, see, e.g., Geneva Convention (III) Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, is what the D.C. Circuit’s main 
concurrence would describe as a “judicially 
enforceable constraint” on the authority of the 
political branches to define the procedures and 
minimal due process safeguards of the military 
commission that tried Hamdan. 
 
                                               
4 Both the President and Congress also exercise some atextual 
constitutional powers by virtue of international law. See, e.g., 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
318–19 (1936); Chae Chang Ping v. United States (Chinese 
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889). 
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III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S MAIN 
CONCURRENCE PLACED NO LIMITS 
ON THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS   
A. The D.C. Circuit’s Main Concurrence 
Transgressed the Supreme Court’s Limits on 
the Jurisdiction of Military Commissions. 
To ensure the judiciary’s integrity and 
independence, any displacement of the judicial power 
from the judicial branch must be carefully limited and 
defined.  See Stern, 564 U.S. at 484; The Federalist 
No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
Military tribunals therefore must be restricted “to the 
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential.”  
Toth, 350 U.S. at 22.  “Every extension of military 
jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of 
civil courts, and . . . acts as a deprivation of the right 
to jury trial and of other treasured constitutional 
protections.”  Reid, 354 U.S. at 21.   
 
Even if erosions of judicial power seem relatively 
inconsequential at first, “illegitimate and 
unconstitutional practices get their first footing in 
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight 
deviations from legal modes of procedure.”  Stern, 564 
U.S. at 503 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 635 (1886)).  This is especially true if the erosion 
is enshrined in a judicial opinion: “The principle then 
lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of 
any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need.”  Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
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 The government argued to the D.C. Circuit that 
the jurisdiction of military commissions is limited to 
international-law-of-war offenses and offenses that 
have historically been tried by U.S. military 
commissions.  Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759–60 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  Yet the main 
concurrence did not even accept the government’s 
proposed jurisdictional limitations.  Instead, it found 
that thin historical practice is sufficient for an offense 
to be triable by military commission.  Id. at 770.   But 
hesitant to exclude emerging crimes such as 
cyberattacks, which would not fall within the rubric 
of historical practice, the opinion said it had no need 
to define “the outer limits of the Constitution in this 
context, other than to say that international law is not 
such a limit.”  Id. at 771.   
 
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence thus 
transgressed the jurisdictional limits on military 
commissions on which this Court has insisted and 
opened the door to a substantial erosion of Article III 
judicial power.  The refusal even to offer guidance on 
the appropriate limits on the subject matter 
jurisdiction of military commissions risks further 
eroding the independence, power, and structural 
integrity of Article III courts.  See Reid, 354 U.S. at 
23–24.    
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B. Widening the Narrow Exception to Article III 
for Military Commissions Places Too Much 
Judicial Power in the Political Branches. 
1. The nature and scope of current hostilities 
threaten traditional limitations on military 
commission jurisdiction. 
 
The threat that military commissions will 
encroach on the general exclusivity of Article III is 
compounded today because traditional limits on the 
jurisdiction of military commissions, which were 
established by the nature and scope of past wars, 
arguably apply differently in the context of a global 
armed conflict that risks continuing indefinitely. See 
Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 835 (dissenting opinion).    
 
Current wars involving non-state belligerents 
make it much more difficult to define those persons 
subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions or 
to determine what conduct occurred on the battlefield.  
Id. at 836.  The Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(AUMF), the basis for Bahlul’s detention and trial by 
military commission, is more than fifteen years old, 
and the global conflict with transnational terrorism is 
the longest war in the nation’s history.  See Hamdan, 
584 U.S. at 684–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that we have been at war with al Qaeda 
since 1996, when the terrorist network declared war 
on the United States).  
 
Because members of al Qaeda and “associated 
forces,” as broadly defined under current law and 
practice, reside, plot, plan, and fight in dozens of 
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nations, the AUMF authorizes a potentially indefinite 
war, potentially indefinite presidential war powers, 
and a potentially permanent system of military 
commissions, often operating in parallel with the 
federal courts.  That arrangement would be wholly at 
odds with the history and functional rationale for 
such a commission.  As Justice O’Connor wrote in 
Hamdi:  
 
[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority 
for the use of “necessary and appropriate force” 
to include the authority to detain for the 
duration of the relevant conflict, and our 
understanding is based on longstanding law-of-
war principles.  If the practical circumstances 
of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of 
the conflicts that informed the development of 
the law of war, that understanding may 
unravel.  But that is not the situation we face 
as of this date. 
 
542 U.S. at 521.  
 
It is the situation we face today, well over a decade 
after Hamdi.  The lack of clear jurisdictional limits on 
military commissions allows the political branches to 
increase the number of people triable by law-of-war 
military commissions.  It is also contrary to the 
concept of necessity that underwrites the history and 
rationale for military commissions. Military 
Commissions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed 
Servs., 111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of David 
Kris, Assistant Attorney General, Nat’l Security 
Division, Dep’t of Justice) (“In the past, military 
commissions have been associated with a particular 
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conflict of relatively short duration.  In the modern 
era, however, the conflict could continue for a much 
longer time.”).   
 
2. The erosion of judicial power through the 
expansion of military commissions threatens 
liberty. 
 
Military commissions do not “rank along with 
Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or 
innocence of people.”  Toth, 350 U.S. at 16.  Relieving 
“those in civil life from military trials” was central to 
the Founders’ rebellion against the British Empire 
and the Framers’ drafting of the Constitution.  See 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 119.  “There are dangers 
lurking in military trials which were sought to be 
avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our 
constitution.”  Toth, 350 U.S. at 22; see Harold 
Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military 
Commissions, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 337, 341 & n.22 
(2002).     
 
Accordingly, permitting military commission 
jurisdiction that is unconstrained by this Court’s 
previously-imposed limitations provides the political 
branches the opportunity to usurp judicial power, 
threatening the structural protections and individual 
rights that Article III protects.  Cf. Stern, 564 U.S. at 
483–84 (“The colonists had been subjected to judicial 
abuses at the hand of the Crown . . . because the King 
of Great Britain ‘made Judges dependent on his Will 
alone . . . .’” (quoting The Declaration of Independence 
para. 11)).  The Court should grant certiorari to 
prevent military commissions’ erosion of the federal 
judicial power vouchsafed by Article III.  And it 
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should reiterate what it has held for at least seventy 
years: military commissions may only try violations of 
the law of war, a branch of international law, in 
circumstances of military necessity.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, amici urge this Court 
to grant Bahlul’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 
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